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THE DIVERGING MEANING OF GOOD FAITH
BY MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN*
ABSTRACT
This article explores the meaning of "good faith" in the context of
corporations and unincorporated entities. The courts, particularly in
Delaware, have developed two different approaches. In the corporate
arena, the courts are fashioning a notion of good faith that seems to require
an examination of director motivations. In the unincorporated arena, good
faith has a meaning grounded in contract law. These are two different
concepts and reflect the fundamental differences between corporations and
unincorporated entities, with the former based on fiduciary duties and the
latter on contract. There are, however, indications that this "divergence" is
starting to disappear, and this article discusses that trend as well.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defining the fiduciary duties of those who control corporations and
unincorporated business entities has tested the flexibility and resourcefulness
of the Delaware courts.' This challenge is traceable to the legislative
response to the landmark decision of Smith v. Van Gorkom,2 where the
Delaware Supreme Court held corporate directors liable in a derivative
action for failing to fully inform themselves-that is, for acting in a grossly
'Nicholas A. Rosenbaum Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. The
author wishes to thank Samantha Marie Pjesky for her valuable research assistance in the
preparation of this article.
'The Delaware Court of Chancery hinted at this frustration in In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litigation (Disney III), the second of its two decisions in this derivative litigation, when
it stated that "the law must be strong enough to intervene against [an] abuse of trust." In re Walt
Disney Derivative Litig. (Disney II1), 825 A.2d 275, 291 (Del. Ch. 2003). Commentators have
observed that the standards-based approach to fiduciary duties of the state courts, developed case by
case, allows the courts to adapt to changing norms. See Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance
with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 399 (2007); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the
Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1573, 1598(2005). The former Chief Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court, Norman Veasey, foreshadowed the development of good faith as a
policing tool in an October 2002 speech. See E. Norman Veasey, The Social Responsibilities of
Lawyers: Reflections on Key Issues of the Professional Responsibilities of Corporate Lawyers in the
Twenty-First Century, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 1, 9 (2003) ("[G]ood faith is likely to emerge as a
central issue of the directors' standard of conduct.").
2488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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negligent fashion-before agreeing to sell the company to an unaffiliated
party. 3 In response to that decision, the Delaware legislature amended its
corporate code, adding section 102(b)(7), which allows corporations to limit
the liability of directors for money damages arising from a breach of the duty
of care. 4  To be effective, the limitation must be in the corporation's
certificate of incorporation.5 More than thirty other states have followed
suit.6 Thus, state legislatures have allowed for, essentially, contractual
modifications of a corporate director's fiduciary duty of care. A director's
duties of loyalty and good faith, however, were unaffected by this legislation
and, with one exception, remain intact.
7
On the unincorporated side, state legislatures, particularly the
Delaware legislature, have been more aggressive in permitting modification
of traditional fiduciary duties.8 Limited liability companies and partnerships
have long been recognized as contractual relationships. 9 Although corporate
directors are constrained by fiduciary duties, participants in unincorporated
entities have had much greater flexibility in structuring their relationship.
When the Delaware Supreme Court suggested, in Gotham Partners, L.P. v.
Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P.,'0 that the parties to a limited partnership
agreement could not eliminate fiduciary duties of the general partner,1 the
Delaware legislature promptly amended the partnership statute to make clear
that they could and, for good measure, included parallel provisions in the
Limited Liability Company Act. 12
The combination of these statutory changes has resulted in some hard
cases; that is, cases in which the articles of incorporation relieved corporate
directors of damages for breach of the duty of care, yet the directors' conduct
appears at least grossly negligent,' 3 and cases in which a partnership
'id. at 893.
'See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).5
1d.
6See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10) (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-40-
104(2)(a) (2006); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2. 10(b)(3) (West 2004); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW
§ 402(b) (McKinney 2003).
7See infra notes 179-88 (dealing with the amendment by the Delaware legislature to DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (200 1), which allows a corporation to renounce any opportunities presented
to its officers, directors, or stockholders).8See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 15-103(f), 18-1101(c) (2005).
9See id. § 15-103(d) ("It is the policy of this chapter to give maximum effect to the principle
of freedom of contract .... ").
10817 A.2d 160 (Del. 2002).
"Id. at 167-68.
12DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2005).
13See McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2001) (analyzing plaintiffs' breach of
[Vol. 34
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agreement or limited liability company (LLC) operating agreement
eliminates a partner's or manager's duty of loyalty, yet the conduct of the
partner or manager is highly questionable by traditional standards. 14 What is
a court to do? This article explores how the courts (particularly Delaware,
where a disproportionate number of cases have been decided) have
responded to this question. In short, the duty of good faith, which cannot be
contracted away in any entity, has evolved into a central doctrine, or tool, to
police conduct that seems to need policing. 15 Good faith provides a basis to
avoid a section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision, or a comparable provision
in the operative documents of an unincorporated entity.'6
To this point, I have considered the directors of corporations together
with the partners, or managers, as the case may be, of unincorporated
entities. In the absence of an exculpatory provision in the articles of
incorporation on due care, or a provision in a partnership or operating
agreement addressing the duties of care or loyalty, the "fiduciaries" in these
entities would all owe duties of loyalty, care, and good faith to their
respective entities. Moreover, case law suggests that the duties of loyalty
and care for corporate directors, general partners, and managers of LLCs are
substantially similar, if not identical. 17 Can the same be said of the duty of
good faith? The thesis of this article is, somewhat counterintuitively, that
good faith does not, and increasingly will not, mean the same thing for
the duty of care claim under the good faith exception to a section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision in
the corporation's certificate), amended on denial of reh'g by 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001); In re
Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (reasoning that
directors' failure to adequately control Caremark employees, who exposed the corporation to
expansive legal liability, was not enough to establish the lack of good faith necessary to hold
directors personally liable); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., No. 6085, 1988 WL
53322, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988), reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 273, 301-02 (1989)
(holding that directors' decision to accept a merger offer that was less favorable to shareholders than
an alternative offer was protected by the business judgment rule), affd, 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989).14See Solar Cells, Inc. v. True N. Partners, LLC, No. 19,477, 2002 WL 749163, at *5-6
(Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002); Brickell Partners v. Wise, 794 A.2d 1, 3-4 (Del. Ch. 2001).
t5See Veasey, supra note 1, at 9.
16See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 906 A.2d 27, 53 (Del. 2006);
Solar Cells, 2002 WL 749163, at *4.
17Compare Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 191 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(stating that directors' duty of loyalty "mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its
shareholders take precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling
shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally"), and Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d
176, 183 (Del. Ch. 1993) (defining directors' standard of care in reference to an ordinary, reasonably
prudent person), with Klotz v. Klotz, 117 S.E.2d 650, 656 (Va. 1961) (stating that partners'
common law duty of loyalty requires each partner to guard his co-partners' interests "equally with his
own" with undeviating devotion), and Kuznik v. Bees Ferry Assocs., 538 S.E.2d 15, 27 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2000) (stating that a partner who acts "with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances" does not breach the duty of care).
2009]
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corporate fiduciaries as it does for partners in partnerships or managers in
LLCs. This divergence arises for two reasons: first, the relevant statutes
differ; and second, the nature of the corporation, which is marked by
mandatory rules, differs from unincorporated entities, which are character-
ized by contract. Indeed, the contractual nature of unincorporated entities
allows investors to structure an entity so as to align the interests of managers
and investors in ways unavailable to corporate managers. In addition, the
managers of an unincorporated entity often hold significant stakes in the
entity, which also incentivizes them to act in the entity's best interests. The
combination of these factors reduces the importance of default fiduciary
duties and judicial monitoring.'8 This article proceeds with a discussion of
what good faith means in the corporate context, then to a contrasting
discussion of how the term is developing in unincorporated entities, and ends
with a short conclusion and observation.
II. TiE CONCEPT OF GOOD FAITH
FOR CORPORATE DIRECTORS
Corporate directors fit the classic definition of fiduciaries: the share-
holders place their "trust and confidence" in the directors, and directors serve
with that understanding. 19 Fiduciary obligations flow logically and naturally
from such a relationship. After delineating the various duties that directors
have, the comments to the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA)
observe that courts often use "the broad concept of fiduciary duty.., as a
frame of reference when evaluating a director's conduct.,
20
Somewhat ironically, corporate codes typically do not expressly
provide that directors owe "fiduciary duties." The Delaware code simply
provides that "[t]he business and affairs of every corporation ... shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors ... ,,21 The
Delaware courts, however, have made it amply clear that Delaware directors
operate subject to the fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good faith.22 The
'8See Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation 17 (Univ. I1. Law & Econ.
Research Papers Series, Research Paper No. LE07-026, 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
pape.tarabstractid=1003790.
19Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939).
'MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) cmt. 1 (2008).2 1DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
nSee, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006); Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys.,
Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154 (Del. 1996); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); 3
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
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MBCA is more forthcoming; it provides that when discharging his or her
duties, a director shall act "in good faith," "in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation," and "with
the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate
under similar circumstances., 23 But the MBCA does not characterize these
as fiduciary duties; rather the heading of the applicable section is "Standards
of Conduct for Directors. ,24 That these standards actually describe fiduciary
duties is not without significance. Because the breach of a fiduciary duty is
tortious conduct, in the absence of some exculpation by statute or
enforceable contract, the defaulting director, and possibly anyone who aided
and abetted the breach,25 may be liable for damages, including possible
26punitive damages. Thus, courts applying the MBCA have made clear that
a breach by a director of this standard of conduct is also a breach of that
director's fiduciary duties to the corporation.27
Like all fiduciary relationships, however, the relationship of a director
to a corporation is one of status, notwithstanding the inroad made by
statutory provisions that allow corporations to exculpate directors for
monetary damages for breach of the duty of care,28 and this is unlikely to
change at any time in the near future. Indeed, the high-profile corporate
scandals of just a few years ago, involving Enron, WorldCom, Tyco,
Adelphia, and other large corporations, have encouraged courts to look more
closely at director conduct. When a section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision
precludes liability for breach of care, and loyalty is not at issue, courts have
CORPORATIONS § 837.50 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002).23MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)-(b) (2008).
24
1d. § 8.30.
25Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2003).26
See Stone v. Martin, 355 S.E.2d 255, 260 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).27See, e.g., Michaelson v. Michaelson, 939 P.2d 835, 841 (Colo. 1997); TJI Realty, Inc. v.
Harris, 672 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). Interestingly, the Delaware corporate code
does not expressly provide a cause of action to remedy a breach of the director's fiduciary duty. The
same might be said of the MBCA, but in section 8.31 the MBCA sets forth the circumstances under
which a director "shall not be liable to the corporation or its shareholders for any decision to take or
not to take action, or any failure to take any action" and later in the same section, the MBCA
specifies what a party must prove "to hold the director liable." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)-
(b) (2008). By contrast, in section 8.33 of the MBCA, the drafters provide an express cause of
action on behalf of the corporation (presumably enforceable in a derivative action) for unlawful
distributions. Id. § 8.33.281t is noteworthy that these provisions only relate to the duty of care and monetary damages.
A director still might be removed for breach of the duty of care, or be subject to injunctive relief. In
short, corporate directors are everywhere subject to the fiduciary duty of care and, of course, to a
duty of loyalty as well. But see infra notes 134-39, regarding section 122 of the Delaware corporate
code.
2009]
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increasingly looked to good faith to provide a basis for liability.29 Moreover,
because good faith cannot be contracted away, even in Delaware, litigation
30implicating this concept is likely to grow.
m11. PRE-DISNEY DELAWARE PRECEDENTS
In the corporate arena, the Delaware courts have struggled to define
the duty of good faith. While the Delaware courts have provided some
clarity to the concept of good faith in the Disney litigation3' and in Stone v.
Ritter32 (discussed below), those decisions were not written on a blank slate
and, because the facts of earlier cases differ from Disney and Stone, there is
no reason to question their precedential value. An early formulation of good
faith, for instance, Perrine v. Pennroad Corp.,33 stated that directors' conduct
that is "reckless and indifferent as to the rights of the stockholders" may
breach the duty of good faith.34 In Perrine, the court held that a settlement
of a shareholder's derivative suit for cancellation of a voting trust agreement
and for an accounting was not so grossly inadequate as to indicate bad faith
of the corporate directors in approving the settlement. 35 On the basis of this
case, one might characterize the obligation of good faith as an objective,
substantive test in which the board's decision is measured against some post-
hoc standard of reasonableness or fairness. Put differently, a board acts in
good faith if its decision is not obviously inimical to the interests of the
corporation.36
29See In re Walt Disney Derivative Litig. (Disney 11I), 825 A.2d 275, 289-90 (Del. Ch.
2003); In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971-72 (Del. Ch. 1996).
3°See generally Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005) (arguing that good faith cannot be
distinguished from the duties of care and loyalty).
31Brehm v. Eisner (Disney I), 746 A.2d 244, 261-64 (Del. 2000); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 907 A.2d 693, 753-56 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006); Disney III, 825 A.2d at 286.
32911 A.2d 362, 372-73 (Del 2006).
3347 A.2d 479 (Del. 1946).
34Id. at 489 (citing Karasik v. Pac. E. Corp., 180 A. 604 (Del. Ch. 1935)).
35Id. In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litigation, is another example of a substantive
review as a mean to judge the absence of good faith. In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Sholders Litig., 542
A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988). The court inquired whether the "decision [was] so far beyond
the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than
bad faith." Id.3 6
McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808,818-19 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Delaware law), amended
on denial ofreh'g by 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001). J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d at 780-81, and
Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 908 (Del. Ch. 1973), might be similarly
characterized.
[Vol. 34
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Somewhat in contrast to Perrine is the 2000 Delaware Court of
Chancery decision in Nagy v. Bistricer,37 where a minority shareholder
alleged that the directors violated their duties of loyalty, care, and good faith
because they abdicated to the acquiring corporation, whose interests were
adverse to the shareholders' interests, the right to set the amount of con-
sideration the shareholders would receive in the merger.38 While the
Delaware Court of Chancery referred to the "so-called 'duty of good faith,"' it
also noted that if an independent concept of good faith is useful at all, its
utility rests "in its constant reminder.. . [that] a director who consciously
disregards his duties to the corporation and its stockholders" may be held
personally liable.39 Although the court did not analyze the claims under the
duty of good faith, it did grant summary judgment in favor of the minority
shareholder's claim that the directors' abdication of their duty to determine a
fair merger price breached their general fiduciary duties.n° Nagy may thus be
characterized as one in which good faith has a subjective element, at least to
the extent that the court noted the importance of the directors' mental state.
41
The most important pre-Disney case on good faith was likely In re
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,42 a case that influenced
the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Stone.43 Caremark involved a
claim that the directors breached their duty of care in failing to adopt an
adequate system to monitor corporate compliance with the Federal Anti-
Referral Payments Law.an In the course of considering the strength of the
plaintiffs claim-and, therefore, the fairness of the settlement agreement-
Chancellor Allen observed that an "utter failure to attempt to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system [exists]" would establish a
breach of the duty of good faith.45  In a sense, such an "utter failure"
describes grossly negligent behavior and, therefore, a breach of the duty of
37770 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 2000).
381d. at 48-49.
391d. at 48-49 n.2.
4°1d. at 61-64.
4'Other courts' decisions also reflect the importance of the director's state of mind. See, e.g.,
Estate of Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F. Supp. 103, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that the business
judgment rule's good faith requirement requires an investigation into the board's motives); Citron v.
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., No. 6085, 1988 WL 53322, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988),
reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 273, 300 (1989) (explaining that the "question [of good faith] calls
for an ad hoc determination of the board's motives"), affid, 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989).
42698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
43Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
44See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 960-61; 42 U.S.C.A § 1320a-7b (West 2008).
45Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
20091
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due care. 46 Moreover, assuming the directors did not have a conflict of
interest-that is, the directors did not benefit personally by the failure to
assure that an appropriate reporting system existed-it would appear that the
"utter failure" cannot amount to a breach of the duty of loyalty.a7 Never-
theless, as discussed below, such neglect by the board is now clearly a
breach of the duty of loyalty, at least in Delaware. One consequence of this
characterization is that the conduct is not exculpable by charter provision. a
Another consequence is that the concept of good faith, and therefore proof of
bad faith, inevitably requires an inquiry into a director's mental state.49
IV. DISNEY AND STONE: GOOD FAITH CLARIFIED
IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT
The paucity of cases in Delaware and elsewhere is somewhat
surprising because the business judgment rule, which protects directors'
business judgments from judicial scrutiny, is inapplicable if the directors did
not act in good faith.50 Thus, one might have expected a robust juris-
prudence to develop over the meaning of good faith. It did not. Section
102(b)(7) and its progeny in other states, however, provided a strong push to
the development of that jurisprudence because under section 102(b)(7),
directors cannot be relieved of liability if they failed to act in good faith.
Plaintiffs who could not base a case on breach of the duty of care, because of
a section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision, and who could not plead a breach
of the duty of loyalty, because the directors acted without a conflict of
interest, were left to argue that the directors' decision was nonetheless
"See, e.g., McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Delaware law);
Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REv.
559, 595-96 (2008). See also Ribstein, supra note 18, at 16 (characterizing Caremark as a state law
version of section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7242 (2008), which requires
disclosure of deficiencies in internal controls).47See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).4 S5ee DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); see also Stone, 911 A.2d at 367
("[S]ection 102(b)(7)... can exculpate directors from monetary liability for a breach of the duty of
care, but not for conduct that is not in good faith or a breach of the duty of loyalty.").
49See, e.g., Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 (Del. Ch. 2007). Vice Chancellor
Strine, writing about a claim that directors failed to adequately oversee the corporation's compliance
with law (a Caremark claim), observed that plaintiffs must allege facts "suggesting that the board
knew that internal controls were inadequate, that the inadequacies could leave room for illegal or
materially harmful behavior, and that the board chose to do nothing about the control deficiencies
that it knew existed." Id. at 940 (emphasis added).
5wSee, e.g., Cede, 634 A.2d at 361 (explaining that the presumption of the business judg-
ment rule and good faith is rebutted by evidence of directors breach of a fiduciary duty).
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actionable because they did not act in good faith. That is precisely the sort
of case that describes the Disney litigation, which provided the Delaware
Supreme Court with an opportunity to explicate the meaning of the term.
The Disney litigation, a shareholders' derivative action, generated five
reported decisions over a period of eight years (1998 to 2006), including two
opinions by the Delaware Supreme Court.51 The action arose out of the
hiring and firing of Michael Ovitz, who served as Disney's president from
October 1, 1995 to December 11, 1996, completing only fourteen months of
a five-year employment agreement.52 Ovitz's termination was designated by
the board as a non-cause termination, entitling him to certain benefits under
his agreement, which amounted to approximately $140 million.53 The
plaintiffs complained that the board approvals of the initial employment
agreement and the subsequent non-cause termination were in breach of the
directors' fiduciary duties.54 Although the plaintiffs were able to get a trial
on the merits, they ultimately failed to sustain their burden of proof.
55
The plaintiffs' initial amended complaint alleged that the directors
breached their duties of loyalty, good faith, and due care.56 That complaint
was dismissed by the Delaware Court of Chancery for inadequate allega-
tions, and that dismissal was sustained in the first trip to the Delaware
Supreme Court.57 In the first supreme court opinion, however, the plaintiffs
were given a glimmer of hope; the court allowed the plaintiffs to file an
amended complaint.58 In their amended complaint, drawing on hints
contained in the supreme court's first opinion, the plaintiffs successfully
alleged that the Disney board of directors breached its duty of good faith.59
On that basis, Chancellor Chandler, in his second formal opinion in the
litigation, sustained the complaint. 6° This opinion, in many ways, was the
most important of the five because the chancellor set out a concept of good
511n re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); Brehm v.
Eisner (Disney 1/), 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
52 1n re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney 1), 731 A.2d 342, 352 (Del. Ch. 1998),
affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner (Disney H), 746 A.2d 244 (Del.
2000). 531n re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney 111), 825 A.2d 275,279 (Del. Ch. 2003).
"41d. at 277-79.55In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 907 A.2d 693, 778-79 (Del. Ch.
2005), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
56Disney 1, 731 A.2d at 353.57Disney II, 746 A.2d at 267.
58id.59Disney 111, 825 A.2d at 289-90.601d.
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faith that guided his subsequent opinion (following the trial) and the
supreme court's opinion upholding the chancellor's verdict in favor of the
defendants. Chancellor Chandler wrote that the plaintiffs' allegation that the
directors had "consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsi-
bilities, adopting a 'we don't care about the risks' attitude concerning a
material corporate decision" amounted to an allegation that the directors
acted in bad faith.6 '
In concluding that the plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of proof,
Chancellor Chandler reiterated that good faith incorporates a notion of
intentional conduct: "[T]he concept of intentional dereliction of duty, a
conscious disregard for one's responsibilities, is an appropriate (although not
the only) standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good
faith. ,62 This notion was central to the supreme court's 2006 decision, which
ended the litigation.63 The court, citing the Chancellor's opinion with ap-
proval, chose to frame the meaning of good faith with reference to what con-
stitutes bad faith: conduct motivated by "subjective bad intent" and conduct
that amounts to "a conscious disregard for one's responsibilities" would con-
stitute bad faith.64 The court stated that these categories of bad faith were
not "exclusive," but they do provide a framework to think about what good
faith and bad faith mean in Delaware.65
Drawing on this pronouncement, one can observe that good faith turns
on a director's motivation or mental state.66 The notion of a "subjective
61Id. at 289 (emphasis omitted).
621n re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 907 A.2d 693,755 (Del. Ch. 2005),
affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (emphasis omitted).
631n re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V'), 906 A.2d 27, 62-68 (Del. 2006).
641d. at 66.
651d. at 67.
66Chancellor Chandler's opinion, after trial, identified the sources of acting in bad faith:
"greed, 'hatred, lust, envy, revenge .... shame or pride."' Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 754 (quoting
Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003)). This, of course, is a list of motives or
mental states underlying an action. Interestingly, the chancellor added that "sloth" might be added to
the list "if it constitutes a systematic or sustained shirking of duty." Id. Sloth is generally not
thought of as a motivation; indeed, it is the absence of motivation. Including sloth, however,
highlights the problem with the good faith doctrine because sloth, or a systematic shirking of duty,
really describes a lack of care. So, the chancellor effectively defined an extreme lack of care as bad
faith behavior. For a case discussing the duty of good faith of a general partner in a limited
partnership, see Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, 1, LP., 624 A.2d
1199 (Del. 1993). In that case, Desert Equities, a limited partner, sued the general partner alleging
that it acted in bad faith in exercising its authority under the partnership agreement to exclude Desert
from participating in investments of the partnership. Id. at 1202. Desert alleged that the general
partner did this in retaliation for Desert's act of filing a suit against affiliates of the general partner in
a different limited partnership. Id. The court, in allowing the case to go to the finder of fact, stated
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intent" or a "conscious disregard" forces one to examine the director's
motivation, in contrast to the fiduciary duty of care, which looks to the
process undertaken by directors to inform themselves, 67 or the fiduciary duty
of loyalty, which looks to the relationship of the director to the transaction
under scrutiny.68 These demarcations are not, however, bright and independ-
ent of one another. For instance, a director may disapprove a transaction,
say the acquisition of an asset, because he prefers that another entity in
which he has an interest make the acquisition. This motivation would fall
neatly under a "subjective bad intent," but could also be understood as a
breach of loyalty. Similarly, a director may choose not to inform herself,
breaching the duty of care, because she has determined to approve a
transaction to further an interest she has in another venture. For instance, a
director may vote to approve the building of a corn-based ethanol plant
because that director also raises com. Under these circumstances, the
director would have violated the duties of care, loyalty, and good faith.
Perhaps sensing the difficulties of differentiating the duty to act in
good faith from the duties of care and loyalty, the Delaware Supreme Court
announced in Stone v. Ritter that good faith was not an independent
fiduciary duty and that the failure to act in good faith "is not conduct that
results, ipso facto, in the direct imposition of fiduciary liability." 69 Rather,
the Stone court characterized the duty to act in good faith as a "subsidiary
element[,] i.e., a condition, 'of the fundamental duty of loyalty,' 70 despite
previously having referred to good faith as one of the "triad" duties of care,
loyalty, and good faith.7 '
By positioning good faith as part of the duty of loyalty, the court
entered into a doctrinal thicket that has muddied, rather than clarified, the
law. Indeed, having determined to explicate the meaning of good faith in
that "a claim of bad faith hinges on a party's tortious state of mind." Id. at 1208. It quoted as
follows from Black's Law Dictionary in support of its conclusion that bad faith is a state of mind:
[The] term "bad faith" is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it
implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates
a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.
id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 337 (5th ed. 1983)).67See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig. (Disney 1), 731 A.2d 342, 369-70 (Del. Ch. 1998); In re Caremark Int'l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996).68See Disney 1, 731 A.2d at 367.
69Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006).
7I1d. at 370 (quoting Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34).
7 1See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634
A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
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Delaware law, the court might just have easily gone in the opposite direction,
characterizing the duty to act in good faith as the only fiduciary duty, with
the duties of loyalty and care as subsets. If good faith means that a fiduciary
must act in the best interests of the beneficiary, then care and loyalty are
automatically covered. Can one act in the best interests of another when one
is serving one's own interests (loyalty), or acting in a consciously negligent
fashion (care)? The Delaware courts have not embraced this approach,
probably for at least two reasons. First, the law has long evolved as
recognizing independent fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. It would be too
radical a departure from precedent to reformulate these duties as a single
duty of good faith. Second, such a reformulation would run counter to the
statutory construct of section 102(b)(7), which assumes a template of
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. But underpinning the language in
Disney, Stone, and Caremark is this unified fiduciary duty and, more
importantly for present purposes, this unified notion informs fiduciaries how
they should conceptualize, for themselves, what their obligations include.
The doctrinal complexity arising from this formulation is apparent
from its application in Stone itself. Stone involved a Caremark claim: a
derivative action seeking compensation from the board of directors for
damages that the company suffered because, allegedly, the board failed to
adequately oversee the corporation's compliance with applicable positive
law.72 In Caremark, the applicable law in question prohibited kickbacks
from Medicare providers to physicians and others.73 In Stone, the applicable
laws related to anti-money-laundering statutes and regulations.74 In both
cases, the federal agencies accused the corporations of violating federal law,
resulting in substantial civil penalties, $10 million in Stone and $250 million
in Caremark.75
The procedural posture in Caremark was a bit unusual; the Delaware
Court of Chancery was asked to approve a settlement of a derivative action.7 6
To decide whether the settlement was fair, the chancellor had to determine
the strength of the underlying claim. Chancellor Allen concluded that a
claim based on a failure to properly oversee the corporation's compliance
with law would only lie if there was "a sustained or systematic failure of the
board to exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
72Caremark, 698 A.2d at 960.
71d. at 961-62.
74Stone, 911 A.2d at 365.
71Id.; Caremark, 698 A.2d at 960-61.
76Caremark, 698 A.2d at 960.
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reasonable information and reporting system [exists]."7 Caremark seemed
to be implicating the directors' duty of care, and was so characterized by
some courts and scholars.78
The Stone court thought otherwise. While it embraced the Caremark
opinion, the court characterized Caremark as a duty of loyalty case,
reasoning that liability for lack of oversight requires a showing that "the
directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.
Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby
demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach
their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good
faith. 7 9 That seems somewhat circuitous and, in any event, excessively
complex. Why not conclude, as Chancellor Allen seemed to conclude, that a
systematic failure to exercise oversight breaches the duty of care? The
answer may relate back to Van Gorkom and section 102(b)(7). If lack of
oversight is a care claim, then the section 102(b)(7) exculpation clause may
operate to preclude relief for the corporation (or a derivative plaintiff), while
the same result would not ensue if the claim is one of loyalty. Moreover, the
court may have been concerned with situations in which the board
affirmatively decides, after careful deliberation, to forego any information
and reporting system because the costs associated with one would exceed the
reasonably perceived benefits. As an abstract proposition, and assuming due
care was exercised, such a decision would be protected by the business
judgment rule and by a section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision. Stone
changes that by simply characterizing lack of oversight as a duty of loyalty
claim.
The Stone court did not explain why it chose not to treat the duty of
good faith as an independent fiduciary duty. In rejecting this notion,
however, the court hedged a bit: " [T]he obligation to act in good faith does
not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing
as the duties of care and loyalty., 80 Why did the court continue after the
phrase "independent fiduciary duty"? Two explanations come to mind.
First, the court may have been saying that the duty of good faith is a duty,
just not a fiduciary one like loyalty and care. In so characterizing the duty of
good faith, the court may have thought that it was simplifying fiduciary law.
"Id. at 971.78See, e.g., McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997, 999 (6th Cit. 2001) (applying Delaware law);
Bainbridge et al., supra note 46, at 595-96.
79Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
SMId. (emphasis added).
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Second, and not unrelated to the first point, the way the court described good
faith is indistinguishable from the duty of loyalty in many instances; good
faith truly is a manifestation of loyalty.
A final consideration in understanding good faith in the corporate
context is the question of proof. Good faith, after all, is a subjective
standard of conduct, depending at least in part on a director's motivations or
mental state. The Delaware courts, however, have recognized the inevita-
bility of relying on inferences in proving that a director acted in bad faith.
For instance, Chancellor Allen observed that measuring a business decision
against some objective standard of reasonableness will indicate whether that
decision is so egregious that it is not entitled to the protections of the
business judgment rule. 8' That, in turn, provides a basis for inferring, or
concluding, that the board acted in bad faith. 2 The Delaware Supreme
Court made the same observation in its first opinion in the Disney litigation,
suggesting that "[i]rrationality... may tend to show that the decision is not
made in good faith. ,
83
V. THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH FOR PARTNERS, MEMBERS,
AND MANAGERS OPERATING UNINCORPORATED ENTITIES
The formulations of good faith for corporate directors cannot explain
the contractual duty of good faith to which members, partners, and managers
of unincorporated entities are subject, at least not when the operating or
partnership agreement disclaims fiduciary duties. Almost by definition, the
parties to such an agreement have agreed that those operating the business
may act with their own interests in mind and the partnership statutes (both in
Delaware and the uniform acts) expressly recognize this: "A partner does
81See In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 10,389, 1989 WL 7036, at *22 n.13
(Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989), reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1132, 1156 n. 13 (1989).82
1d.
83Brehm v. Eisner (Disney 11), 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). See also White v. Panic,
783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001) ("The standards for corporate waste and bad faith by the board
are similar. To prevail on a waste claim or a bad faith claim, the plaintiff must overcome the general
presumption of good faith by showing that the board's decision was so egregious or irrational that it
could not have been based on a valid assessment of the corporation's best interests."); Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, No. 20,228-NC, 2004
WL 1949290, at * 17 n.92 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24,2004), reprinted in 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 535,564 n.92
(2005) ("[Tlhe court will generally be required to look to the Board's actions as circumstantial
evidence of [a] state of mind."); Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business
Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REv. 398,
426-32 (2007) (discussing the issue).
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not violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the partnership
agreement merely because the partner's conduct furthers the partner's own
interest."s84
Thus, the duties of a partner in a partnership or a manager of a limited
liability company are not fiduciary duties. While the fiduciary nature of, say,
a partnership was once beyond peradventure, 85 Delaware and many other
states have clearly moved in a different direction. For instance, although the
Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act (DRUPA), like the standard
Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), states that a partner owes to the
partnership the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care,86 the Delaware statute
also provides that "relations among the partners and between the partners
and the partnership are governed by the partnership agreement" 87 and that
"[a] partnership agreement may provide for the limitation or elimination of
any and all liabilities for breach of contract and breach of duties (including
fiduciary duties) of a partner."88 Other partnership statutes pointedly avoid
characterizing the duties of loyalty and care as "fiduciary duties.'
89
Therefore, in Delaware and other jurisdictions that allow modification or
elimination of the duties of care and loyalty, whether such duties are
statutorily characterized as fiduciary duties or not, the relationship of the
parties is best viewed as contractual rather than status based. 90 The statute
serves the role of providing default terms, not defining the underlying
relationship of the parties.91 In the Delaware code, that result is stated
expressly, as noted above.
For the hard cases involving unincorporated entities, then, the
Delaware courts have moved outside of the familiar jurisprudence of
fiduciary duties. A source of the jurisprudence may well be the Delaware
84REVISED UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 404(e) (2007). The Delaware act is similar, substituting the
word "solely" for "merely." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-404(d) (2005).85See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).





See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-64-404 (2008); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§ 152.204(d) (Vernon 2007).
9°See the comments of Delaware Chief Justice Myron T. Steele in a recent law review
article: "[C]ourts should look to the parties' agreement and apply a contractual analysis rather than
analogizing to traditional notions of corporate governance." Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of
Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 1 (2007).
91Twin Bridges Ltd. P'ship v. Draper, No. 235 1-VCP, 2007 WL 2744609, at *12 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 14, 2007).
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Supreme Court's venerable decision in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries,
Inc.92 Schnell, a corporate law case, was expressly decided on what the court
referred to as equitable grounds.93 But the case can be viewed as an ancestor
of the modem concept of good faith for unincorporated entity law.
Schnell involved an effort by a corporate board to thwart a proxy
contest by dissident shareholders.94 The tactic chosen by the directors was
the advancement of the date of the annual meeting by five weeks, thereby
shortening the time that the dissidents would have to solicit other
shareholders. The Delaware Court of Chancery refused to enjoin the
meeting, reasoning that the board of directors changed the bylaws in a
manner consistent with the Delaware corporate code. 95 The Delaware
Supreme Court, however, reversed, announcing that "inequitable action does
not become permissible simply because it is legally possible." 96 Inter-
estingly, the court did not cite fiduciary duties, much less the concept of
good faith in rendering its opinion. But good faith fits rather nicely, at least
to the extent that good faith looks to the actor's motivations. In Schnell, the
directors were motivated not by the best interests of the corporation, but
rather by maintaining themselves in office.97 And while many cases have
condemned such motivations as violating a director's fiduciary duty,98 until
recently courts rarely characterized such motivations as a violation of good
faith. That is, indeed, what is at issue. Acting for the best interests of Chris-
Craft would require the directors to put aside all personal interests. Their
conduct suggested that personal interests did inform their decisions.
There is another respect in which good faith could be used to
understand the outcome in Schnell, one that depends on contractual analysis
and fits neatly with the concept of unincorporated entities as contractual
entities. The power and authority upon which the directors depended was
derived from the bylaws. The bylaws form part of the contract or
92Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. (Schnell I1), 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). The Delaware
courts have extended Schnell to the limited partnership context. See Twin Bridges, 2007 WL
2744609, at *21; Alpine Inv. Partners v. LJM2 Capital Mgmt., L.P., 794 A.2d 1276, 1284 n.13
(Del. Ch. 2002); Juran v. Bron, No. 16,464,2000 WL 1521478, at *19-20 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6,2000).
93Schnel 11, 285 A.2d at 439.
"Id. at 438.
95Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.(Schnell 1), 285 A.2d 430,437 (Del. Ch. 1971), rev'd,
285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
'Schnell 11, 285 A.2d at 439.
971d.
98See, e.g., McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 824 (6th Cir. 2001); Furash & Co. v. McClave,
130 F. Supp. 2d 48, 53 (D.D.C. 2001).
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understanding between the shareholders and the directors.99 In exercising
their discretionary authority under the bylaws to change the date of the
annual meeting, the directors were subject to the contractual duty of good
faith. They could not use that discretionary authority in a way that
disappointed the reasonable expectations of the shareholders, but that is
precisely what they did, and intentionally so. Thus, the directors violated the
contractual duty of good faith and their action was rightly set aside by the
court.
Several recent cases support this notion of good faith. Perhaps the
most engaging of these cases is VGS, Inc. v. Castiel,'°° which involved a
freeze-out merger engineered by two of the three managers of Virtual
Geosatellite LLC. 10 1 Geosatellite had, essentially, two investors. One,
Castiel, owned 75% of the equity, and the other, Sahagen, owned 25%.102
Each of the investors held their membership interests in Geosatellite
indirectly, through limited liability companies that they owned and
controlled. 10 3 Under the operating agreement, Castiel was entitled to appoint
two managers and Sahagen one.'4 Each of the investors named themselves
as managers and Castiel also named Quinn.10 5 Less than two years after the
venture came together, Sahagen convinced Quinn to join forces with him.1°6
The two agreed to merge Geosatellite into VGS, Inc., reducing Castiel's
equity from 75% to 37.5%. 1°7 They achieved this by executing a written
consent, as permitted by Delaware law, without notice to Castiel. 08
While the procedures followed by Sahagen and Quinn were perfectly
consistent with the letter of Delaware law, just as the conduct of the directors
was in Schnell, then-Vice Chancellor Steele would not permit the action to
stand. Expressly relying on equitable maxims, the court found a fiduciary
duty between managers of LLCs, writing:
99See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 109 (2001).1"No. 17,995, 2000 WL 1277372 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000), reprinted in 27 DEL. I. CORP.
L. 454 (2002).
Ild, at *2, reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 457.1 1d. at *1, reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 456.
103
1d.
'04VGS, Inc., 2000 WL 1277372, at *1, reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 456.
'06id. at *2, reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 456.
'O71d., reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 457.
' 99VGS, Inc., 2000 WL 1277372, at *2, reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 457.
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The General Assembly never intended, I am quite confident, to
enable two managers to deprive, clandestinely and surrepti-
tiously, a third manager representing the majority interest in the
LLC of an opportunity to protect that interest by taking an
action that the third manager's member would surely have
opposed if he had knowledge of it. My reading of Section 18-
404(d) [which permits action by managers without prior notice]
is grounded in a classic maxim of equity-"Equity looks to the
intent rather than to the form.'°9
Our system of law would be a sad one indeed if there was not some
basis to set aside an action grounded in such duplicity. But getting there is
another matter entirely. It may be that Quinn was an agent of Castiel and
acted disloyally, but that might simply give rise to a claim by Castiel against
Quinn, leaving the merger intact. Moreover, it is unclear that a manager of
an LLC is an agent of the person responsible for his or her appointment. It
may be that managers, like corporate directors, have a fiduciary duty to act in
the best interests of the entity, and it might have been in the best interests of
the entity to approve this transaction. That inquiry did not arise in the
opinion.
Alternatively, it may be that Sahagen and Quinn breached duties to
their co-manager, Castiel. Indeed, the court so found, holding that Sahagen
and Quinn "owed a duty of loyalty to the LLC, its investors and Castiel, their
fellow manager."" 10 That a manager owes duties to a co-manager, however,
is not immediately self-evident. A manager's duty is to act in the best
interests of the entity, not the interests of a co-manager. 11'
Yet another way to think about this case is in terms of good faith,
which the court did not address. Could Quinn and Sahagen have been acting
in good faith, given their contractual understandings with Castiel, if they so
conspired? To ask the question is, of course, to answer it. Castiel's reason-
able expectations were that he would participate in managerial decisions,
notwithstanding the statutory provision that allowed his co-managers to act
without him.ll2 So, it was not a gloss on the statute that protects Castiel, but
°91d. at *4, reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 459 (citations omitted).
"Old., reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 460.
1 1See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2005).
" 2VGS, Inc., 2000 WL 1277372, at *4, reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 460.
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an application of the good faith standard, which protects a contracting party
from the opportunistic behavior of the other party to the contract. 1
3
While the bylaws represented the relevant contract in Schnell, in VGS,
Inc., the relevant contract was the Delaware statute. The Delaware Limited
Liability Company Act consists, essentially, of default provisions.1 14 Section
18-404(d), under which Sahagen and Quinn achieved their nefarious plot,
permitted them to consent to a merger without notifying Castiel.1 15 Under
the circumstances of this case, however, good faith required them to notify
Castiel, and the decision could easily have rested on that ground.
Another recent case demonstrating the equitable tendency of the
Delaware Court of Chancery, and the overlap of equity and good faith, is
Haley v. Talcott.116 This case involved an attempt by Haley, a fifty percent
owner of an LLC, to obtain judicial dissolution of the LLC on the grounds
that it was not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of the LLC.1"
7
Haley's co-owner, Talcott, objected on the basis that the company was
continuing to operate, and the LLC operating agreement included an exit
provision that precluded judicial dissolution. 18 The court sided with Haley
because if Haley's interest was acquired pursuant to the exit provision, he
would still be liable for a mortgage on LLC property that he had personally
guaranteed. 9 The court thus concluded that it was not "equitable to force
Haley to use the exit mechanism in this circumstance." 120 The exit provision
was unconditional and, aside from equitable considerations, the court cited
no reason why the provision should not apply under the circumstances.
It is fair to ask, with respect to the decision, whether a healthy
deference to contractual freedom might not have yielded a different result.
In a two-person LLC, if the parties provided, as these parties did, an
opportunity for either to exit and have his interest repurchased at fair market
value, it is arguably inequitable to the nonexiting partner to require a
dissolution and liquidation of the entity. Each party presumably assumed the
risk that a falling out would result in a buy-out of his interest. Further, if a
guarantee was executed after formation of the entity, each party assumed an
113 See Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 583 N.E.2d 806, 821 (Mass. 1991);
Warner v. Konover, 553 A.2d 1138, 1141 (Conn. 1989).4 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101 to -1109 (2005).
"5VGS, Inc., 2000 WL 1277372, at *4, reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 459.
116864 A.2d 86, 96-98 (Del. Ch. 2004).
"'Id. at 87.
"'1d. at 87-88.
"9See id. at 88-89.
120Haley, 864 A.2d at 98.
2009]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
additional risk that the guarantee obligation would continue even after a buy-
out. From a contractual perspective, one might argue that the court rewrote
the parties' operating agreement, so that it provided that if either party
wanted to withdraw from the company while a guarantee was outstanding,
the withdrawing party could force a liquidation of the company.
There is, however, another way to look at the case. The real problem
may have been that Talcott failed to take any steps to restructure the
guarantee and relieve Haley from liability. Indeed, the court included a
footnote in its opinion disclosing that, when asked, counsel for Talcott
demurred on the problem of the continuing liability and just stated that each
party would remain liable on the guarantee. 121 Thus, this case, too, impli-
cates contractual notions of good faith. Yes, Talcott had a right under the
agreement to insist on the repurchase of Haley's membership interest if
Haley wished to withdraw, but acting in good faith Talcott would, at least,
have sought to relieve Haley from the mortgage obligation. Talcott's refusal
to do so made dissolution of the company more appealing to the court.122
This interpretation of Haley v. Talcott fits nicely with the analysis in
VGS, Inc. In both cases, the courts implicitly recognized that resolving
disputes by reference to the unadorned words in an agreement or statutory
provision was not sufficient. Rather, notions of contractual good faith
cannot be ignored; parties who have rights under an agreement are limited in
the way that they may exercise those rights so as not to unreasonably
disappoint the expectations of the other party. This is precisely the concept
that animated Vice Chancellor Strine's lengthy and persuasive opinion in
Gefinan v. Weeden Investors, L.P. 123
Gelfinan involved a squeeze out of outside investors by the
management of Weeden Investors at a price substantially below fair market
value.124 The limited partnership agreement in Gelfinan gave a great deal of
discretion to the general partner in managing the partnership and ordering its
affairs. 125  In conflict situations, however, including the transactions
involved in this case, the general partner was required to consider, among
other things, "the relative interests of each party to such conflict." 126 Based
on a careful review of the record, the court concluded that the general
1211d. at 98 n.36.
1221d. at 98.
123859 A.2d 89 (Del. Ch. 2004).
1241d. at 102-10.
"5Id. at 93-94.126Id. at 111.
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partner did not rationally consider the interests of the complaining limited
partners and, therefore, breached the partnership agreement.1 27 An important
factor in reaching this decision was what the court considered to be the
reasonable expectations of the plaintiffs, who could not have anticipated
being forced out of the partnership at less than fair market value, while the
insiders fared far better. The court colorfully concluded: "For a General
Partner to knowingly deprive an equity partner of her partnership interest for
less than what it is worth without a pre-existing contractual right to do so is,
by an American's definition, bad faith action. That is precisely what
occurred here."128 In other words, the contract interpretation was informed
by underlying notions of good faith. The contractual freedom that the
general partner thought it had provided for itself-and the contract was
extraordinarily protective of the general partner-was not, and could not be,
an impenetrable shield.
A more reinforced shield was pierced in Solar Cells, Inc. v. True
North Partners, LLC.129 This case, like VGS, Inc., involved a near freeze-
out merger with a resulting complaint by the diluted party.130 Solar Cells
and True North each owned a fifty percent interest in an LLC called First
Solar. 13 For various reasons, however, True North was entitled to appoint
three of the five managers of the LLC and clearly controlled First Solar.'
32
The venture required additional capital, which True North provided in the
form of convertible loans. 133 The parties sought additional investors and
engaged the services of an investment banker. 134 Eventually, True North
unilaterally decided to convert its loans to equity and to merge First Solar
into a new LLC that it wholly owned. 35 As a result of the merger, Solar
Cells' equity interest would be reduced to five percent. 136 It sought and
obtained an injunction from the Delaware Court of Chancery.
137
The "reinforced shield" in this case consisted of an operating
agreement that sought to relieve True North from liability for claims that it
127Gelfinan, 859 A.2d at 121.
128 ld. at 124.
129
NO. 19,477, 2002 WL 749163 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002).
'3°d. at *1.131Id. at *1-2.
32d. at *1.
1
33Solar Cells, Inc., 2002 WL 749163, at *2.1341Id.
1351d.
136Cd7
137 Solar Cells, Inc., 2002 WL 749163, at * 1.
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engaged in a conflict of interest transaction. Section 4.18(a) of the operating
agreement provided:
Solar Cells and [First Solar] acknowledge that the True North
Managers have fiduciary obligations to both [First Solar] and to
True North, which fiduciary obligations may, because of the
ability of the True North Managers to control [First Solar] and
its business, create a conflict of interest or a potential conflict
of interest for the [T]rue North Managers. Both [First Solar]
and Solar Cells hereby waive any such conflict of interest or
potential conflict of interest and agree that neither True North
nor any True North Manager shall have any liability to [First
Solar] or to Solar Cells with respect to any such conflict of
interest or potential conflict of interest, provided that the True
North managers have acted in a manner which they believe in
good faith to be in the best interest of [First Solar].
138
The court dismissed this provision because the plaintiff was only
seeking to enjoin the merger, not obtain a recovery from True North.139 The
court then went on to explain that it was likely that plaintiff would prevail on
the merits because True North did not appear to have acted in good faith. 14
This finding was based on the fact that the True North managers consented
to the merger the day after having met with the Solar Cells managers, a
meeting at which the True North managers failed to disclose their intent to
merge into their affiliate. 141 Since the True North managers did not act in
good faith, the court concluded, they would have the burden of demon-
strating the entire fairness of the merger: fair dealing and fair price. 142 Based
on the record, the court held that it was unlikely that True North could
satisfy that burden of proof. 1
43
This case turns on contractual notions of good faith. Yes, the True
North managers had the power and authority to approve a merger with an
affiliate, but they had to exercise that power in good faith. The way that they





41Solar Cells, Inc., 2002 WL 749163, at *4.
1421d. at *4-5 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983)).
1431d. at *5.
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went about their business convinced the court that they did not act in good
faith.
This case raises some intriguing questions. The court seemed to
ignore the waiver by Solar Cells of True North's conflict of interest. Did that
waiver not preclude relief? Was there a contractual solution that would
protect True North? Suppose that the above-quoted exculpatory provision
had been a bit more comprehensive and precluded equitable relief. Or,
suppose that the operating agreement had expressly provided that when the
True North managers act, they need not give notice to the Solar Cells
managers. It is fair to speculate that contractually there was nothing that
True North could have provided that would give it the freedom to act as it
sought to act in this case. The court cited Schnell in its analysis,' 44 signaling
that Delaware will not abandon equitable principles, regardless of the
underlying operating agreement. 1
45
Finally, consider the recent case of Blackmore Partners, L.P. v. Link
Energy LLC, 146 in which the court sustained a complaint in a class action
despite the absence of specific allegations that would suggest that the
business judgment rule did not protect the actions of the defendants.1 47 The
LLC agreed to sell substantially all of its assets for an amount of money that
would pay off its creditors but leave nothing for the members, or "common
unit holders," of the LLC. 148 There was no allegation that the defendants
labored under a conflict of interest or failed to exercise adequate care in
rendering the decision. 149 Nevertheless, Vice Chancellor Lamb denied the
1441d. at *4 n.9.
145Not all would agree with the observation that Delaware courts would fail to honor an
agreement in such circumstances. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation and Corporate
Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 131 (arguing that the Delaware cases involving unincorporated
entities demonstrate a strong fidelity to the parties' agreement). Professor Ribstein cites, among
other cases, Miller v. American Real Estate Partners, LP., where, indeed, Vice Chancellor Strine
states that the agreement must be honored, even over the "piteous pleas of limited partners who are
seeking to escape the consequences of their own decisions ..... Id. at 148-50 (quoting Miller v.
Am. Real Estate Partners, L.P., No. 16,788,2001 WL 1045643, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 6,2001)). But
in Miller the limited partners prevailed, as Vice Chancellor Strine ultimately held that the drafters of
the partnership agreement did not explicitly preclude the application of default fiduciary duties.
Miller, 2001 WL 1045643, at *9. Narrow construction of an agreement provided relief for plaintiffs
in two other Delaware cases: Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., No. 15,539, 2000 WL 268297, at
*3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2000), and In re Marriott Hotel Prop. H Ltd. P'ship., No. 14,961, 2000 WL
128875, at *10-13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2000), reprinted in 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 424, 443-48 (2000).
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motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, reasoning that "the allegation
that the Defendant Directors approved a sale of substantially all of Link's
assets and a resultant distribution of proceeds that went exclusively to the
company's creditors raises a reasonable inference of disloyalty or intentional
misconduct."
150
While the vice chancellor's decision is defensible-plaintiffs should
be given the opportunity to make a case-the necessary factual allegations
are nonetheless lacking. At least, the opinion fails to point to any specific
allegations to support the inference of disloyalty or intentional misconduct.
Rather, the plaintiffs are complaining about the substance of the decision,
which normally is not something that the directors have to defend. 151 But the
vice chancellor's decision can be justified on the basis that there is an
inference of bad faith, which would, of course, remove the protection of the
business judgment rule and the exculpation clause in the operating
agreement. Arguably, the complaint suggested that the directors acted "in
conscious disregard" of their responsibilities, which, in this case, was to
maximize the return to unit holders. 152 This is not disloyalty in the normal
sense of a conflict of interest, but is disloyalty in the sense that other cases
used the term in reference to good faith.
Those skeptical of my observation that the Delaware courts will avoid
inequitable contracts, might cite two cases as taking a contrary view:
Brickell Parmers v. Wise 153 and Sonet v. Timber Co., LP. 154 These cases
seem to support freedom of contract over a claim based on vague equitable
notions. A closer look at these cases, however, demonstrates that the
1 5°Blackmore Partners, L.P., 864 A.2d at 86.15 'Id. at 85.
1 52
See id. at 84; see also Forsythe v. ESC Fund Mgmt. Co., No. 1091-VCL, 2007 WL
2982247 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2007), reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 239 (2008) (providing an
example in which the court's rather narrow construction of a limited partnership agreement enabled
the plaintiff to withstand a motion to dismiss). Professor Ribstein characterizes this case as an
exception to the approach of the Delaware courts to agreements involving unincorporated entities,
where in his view the courts defer to the agreement of the parties and recognize that the agreement
may provide alternatives to the need for judicial monitoring. See Ribstein, supra note 145, at 158-
61. But this case, too, is better explained as an application of the concept of contractual good faith
than an exception to contractual freedom. The plaintiff complained that the general partner had
breached his duty of oversight and the court agreed that such a duty existed. Forsythe, 2007 WL
2982247, at *1, reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 239-40. In the absence of oversight by the
general partner, the limited partners were dependent on conflicted parties to manage their
investments. Id. Arguably, at least, given those conflicts, the limited partners could have reasonably
expected oversight by the general partner.
153794 A.2d 1 (Del. Ch. 2001).
'm722 A.2d 319 (Del. Ch. 1998).
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equities involved made it easy for the courts to enforce the contracts against
what were, in reality, weak claims based on fiduciary duty.
In Brickell, for instance, the limited partners of El Paso Energy
Partners, L.P. brought a derivative action complaining of an acquisition by
the partnership of Crystal Gas Storage, Inc., which was an affiliate of El
Paso's general partner, DeepTech International.155 El Paso Energy Corpora-
tion owned both DeepTech and Crystal Gas.156 This affiliation meant that
DeepTech had a conflict of interest in structuring and approving the
acquisition on behalf of the partnership. The partnership agreement pro-
vided that in conflict situations, the general partner could refer the matter to
a special committee of its board for approval, which happened in this case.1
57
The limited partner complained that the special committee was conflicted
because the committee consisted of two directors of DeepTech. 58 Such
directors, the plaintiffs argued, would have loyalties to the general partner
and to the partnership and, thus, in this instance, were in conflict.159 That
being the case, the burden should be on the defendants to demonstrate the
fairness of the transaction.'
60
Vice Chancellor Strine rejected this argument and dismissed the
complaint, noting that the general partner acted consistently with the
agreement. 161 On its face, Brickell is a troubling case because the partner-
ship agreement arguably did not contain sufficient safeguards to assure fair
treatment to the partnership and limited partners in conflict transactions.
The plaintiff argued that the fairness of the transaction would be enhanced if
the decision makers for the general partner were unaffiliated with the general
partner and that the agreement should be so construed. 16 2 The court, how-
ever, found that the agreement did not require that the members of the
special committee be unaffiliated. 163 Rather, the agreement implied that the
special committee would consist of directors. 164
But the court did not end the opinion by simply stating that the general
partner acted consistently with the agreement. First, the court noted that the
1








163Brickell, 794 A.2d at 2.
164Id.
2009]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
plaintiff failed to allege that the members of the special committee had any
conflict other than the structural conflict that arises from being directors of
the corporate general partner.165 Second, the court noted that the members of
the special committee were not members of the management of the general
partner, were not shareholders of the general partner or the general partner's
parent, and that there were no allegations that the process of the special
committee was tainted, by fraud or otherwise. 166 Finally, the court noted
early in the opinion that there was little support in the complaint for the
allegation that the terms of the merger were substantively unfair to the
limited partnership. 167 Taken together, the court's observations leave the
door open for a different outcome in a subsequent case where the plaintiff
can allege that, even though the process followed was consistent with the
agreement, the transaction is nonetheless challengeable on the basis of a
substantial conflict by the decision makers or a specific allegation of
unfairness. Under those circumstances, the evolving concept of good faith
would provide the basis for judicial scrutiny.
Similar observation can be made about the Sonet case. Under the
partnership agreement, the general partnership had sole discretion to decide
upon, and recommend to the limited partners, the terms of the conversion or
merger. 68 The limited partners alleged, among other things, that notwith-
standing this broad grant of power, the general partner owed the limited
partners the default fiduciary duties set forth in the DRULPA.169 Chancellor
Chandler framed the issue as, "what controls the governance process in the
context of limited partnerships-the partnership agreement or common law
fiduciary duty doctrines?"'170 The court resolved this issue with a forceful
statement "that the unambiguous terms of the partnership agreement have the
effect of limiting the Court's review of the transaction presently in
dispute." 171 Somewhat later in the opinion, Chancellor Chandler restated his
holding with a statement that seemed to embrace freedom of contract with
little opportunity for future attack on the principle: "Thus, I think it is a
'651d. at 4-5.
"6Id. at 2.
167Brickell, 794 A.2d at 4.
168Sonet v. Timber Co., L.P., 722 A.2d 319, 324 (Del. Ch. 1998).
169d. at 321. Plaintiff alleged that the terms of the conversion were unfair to the limited
partners. The limited partners had a right to vote on the transaction, but had not yet done so at the
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correct statement of law that principles of contract preempt fiduciary
principles where the parties to a limited partnership have made their inten-
tions to do so plain."'
172
Notwithstanding these categorical statements, a few aspects of this
case are worth noting. First, while the partnership agreement granted the
general partner "sole discretion" to recommend the terms of the conversion,
the deal required the approval of sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the
limited partners. 173 Second, the case was brought before the limited partners
had voted; indeed, "the proxy statement ha[d] not yet been distributed." 1
74
Thus, the court may have determined (although it did not so state) that the
plaintiffs' claims were not yet ripe for adjudication. If the limited partners
failed to approve the deal, the complaint becomes moot. On the other hand,
if the proxy statement did provide full disclosure and if the limited partners
then approved the transaction, the equities would seem to lie with the general
partner. All the court decided in this case was that the limited partners could
protect themselves: "their remedy is the ballot box, not the courthouse." 1
75
In short, this was an easy case for freedom of contract; plaintiff had little, if
anything, to complain about.
Of equal importance, for present purposes, is that the court did not
close the door to the consideration of equitable notions in future cases.
176
The court stated that, while alternative business entities are not subject to the
notions of fairness inherent in corporate law, a Delaware court will look to
"statutory default rules" and what the court referred to as "traditional notions
of fiduciary duties" when "principles of equity are implicated."'
177
VI. A MOVE TOWARD CONVERGENCE
In 2000, and in response to Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 7 8 the
Delaware legislature added a subsection to the powers section of the
17
2
Sonet, 722 A.2d at 322.
173Id. at 324 & n.13.
1741d. at 327.
17'Id. at 326. See also R.S.M. Inc. v. Alliance Capital Management Holdings LP., which,
like Sonet, involved a challenge by outside investors to a reorganization of a partnership. R.S.M.
Inc. v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. Holdings L.P., 790 A.2d 478, 481 (Del. Ch. 2001). In R.S.M.,
however, the court concluded that the complaint alleged inadequate disclosure in the proxy
statement. Id. at 502.
1
76Sonet, 722 A.2d at 323-24.
71Id. at 324.
178No. 9,477, 1989 WL 48746 (Del. Ch. May 5, 1989), reprinted in 15 DEL. J. CORP. L.
218 (1990). Siegman involved the Tri-Star shareholders' derivative action seeking a judicial
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Delaware corporate code.179 Section 122(17) of the Delaware corporate code
now provides that a Delaware corporation has the power to:
[r]enounce, in its certificate of incorporation or by action of its
board of directors, any interest or expectancy of the corporation
in, or in being offered an opportunity to participate in, specified
business opportunities or specified classes or categories of
business opportunities that are presented to the corporation or 1
or more of its officers, directors or stockholders. 80
To the extent that the renunciation is by resolution of the board of directors,
the provision is not a significant departure from pre-existing law: the board
always had the power to forgo a business opportunity and allow a director to
seize that opportunity.' 81 Such a decision, however, was, and presumably
continues to be, subject to judicial review. If the board was conflicted, or
failed to act with care, in appropriate circumstances it may face liability for
its decision.1 82  The statute goes beyond that, however, permitting the
certificate of incorporation to specify classes or categories of business oppor-
tunities that the corporation, in advance, renounces. Thus, the certificate of
incorporation of a cellular telephone company might provide that the
corporation renounces any interest or expectancy in business opportunities to
develop cellular systems outside of a particular region. 183 Investors in the
declaration that certain articles in Tri-Star's amended certificate of incorporation were invalid under
Delaware law. Id. at *4, reprinted in 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 229. The articles exempted Coca-Cola
and Time directors, who also served as Tri-Star directors, from liability "for breach of fiduciary duty
as a result of having engaged in the same line of business as Tri-Star or having pursued a corporate
opportunity belonging to Tri-Star." Id. at *7, reprinted in 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 234. The
Delaware Court of Chancery allowed the claim to survive a motion to dismiss because the articles
could not eliminate or limit the liability of Tr-Star directors for breach of their duty of loyalty,
which is prohibited by section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware corporate code. Id. at *8, reprinted in 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. at 236.
17
9
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2001).
18 °1d.
18tSee Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 157 (Del. 1996).
182See Siegman, 1989 WL 48746, at *7-8, reprinted in 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 235-36.
1
8 3See Broz, 673 A.2d at 154-57. In Broz, Cellular Information Systems, Inc. (CIS) alleged
that Broz, a former director of CIS, breached his fiduciary duties to CIS when he accepted a
corporate opportunity to acquire a cellular service license for a certain region without formally
presenting the opportunity to CIS's board of directors. Id. at 150-51. Under the accepted corporate
opportunity doctrine, a corporate director may still be able to take a business opportunity for himself
if the corporation is financially unable to exploit the opportunity, "the corporation holds no interest
or expectancy in the opportunity," or the opportunity is presented to the director in his individual
capacity. Id. at 155. But without an express provision, if the director does not present the
"corporate opportunity" to the corporation first, his actions may be subject to a judicial review of
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company presumably understand this when making their investment, and
they should have no grounds to object when a director pursues a business
opportunity that, but for this provision, he would have been obligated to
present to the corporation. Such a provision would clearly be unobjection-
able in an unincorporated entity,184 and now corporate investors are treated
similarly.
One, however, should not overlook the significance of this provision.
While the certificate of incorporation has always been a contract of sorts, the
ability of the promoters of a corporation to alter fiduciary duties in the
certificate has been limited. Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware corporate
code was the first significant departure from this tradition. 85  Section
122(17) now permits modification of the duty of loyalty. 186 With the duties
of care and loyalty now subject to modification in the certificate, the bright
line between corporations and unincorporated entities, where the former was
characterized by mandatory fiduciary duties and the latter by freedom of
contract, has been blurred.187 That, in turn, suggests that the role that good
faith plays in unincorporated entities, a contract principle, may find its way
in corporate law as well.' 88
whether the objective facts support a reasonable inference that the director did or did not usurp a
corporate opportunity. See id. Here, under appellate review, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
Broz did not usurp a corporate opportunity because the corporation was financially unable to exploit
the opportunity, it was not clear that CIS had an interest in the license, and the opportunity was
offered to the director in his individual capacity. Id. at 155-57.
'S4U.S. Cellular Inv. Co. of Allentown v. Bell Ati. Mobile Sys., Inc., 677 A.2d 497,498-99
nn.1-2, 504 (Del. 1996).
185DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
61d. § 122(17).
187See Mark J. Loewenstein, A New Direction for State Corporate Codes, 68 U. COLO. L.
REV. 453, 453-73 (1997) (reasoning that as states' corporate statutes become more enabling, thus
containing fewer mandatory provisions, the statutes governing corporations and unincorporated
associations will become indiscernible from one another, but also arguing that the statutes should
remain distinct because both the traditional corporation and the contract-based limited liability
business entity have their own distinct advantages).
ISAnother "convergence" example may be found in In re Regional Diagnostics, LLC,
where the court refused to dismiss, on motion, a complaint against the managers of a limited liability
company for breach of fiduciary duty. In re Regl Diagnostics, LLC, 372 B.R. 3, 31 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2007). The crux of the complaint was that the managers failed to exercise adequate oversight,
a Caremark claim. See id. at 9. The bankruptcy court, applying Stone and Caremark, refused to
dismiss the complaint, thus recognizing that the managers of a limited liability company had a
fiduciary duty of oversight identical to that of corporate directors. See id. at 28-31. Interestingly,
however, the opinion focused on whether, or the extent to which, the operating agreement absolved
the managers of their fiduciary duties. Id. Thus, the case can fairly be characterized as a contract
case.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In corporate law, good faith is becoming solidified as a concept
turning largely on director motivations or the mental state of directors: did
the directors act in conscious disregard of their responsibilities? Directors
charged with acting in the best interests of their corporation breach their duty
of good faith (and loyalty) when they consciously disregard that duty.
Motive is an important element here because we can best understand if it
was a conscious disregard if we understand what motivated their conduct.
The Delaware courts have been cognizant of the need to protect directors
from liability for their negligent, or even grossly negligent, conduct. The
way to do that is to recognize that the same conduct may be explained by
inattention (negligence) or conscious disregard of responsibilities (bad faith).
In the law of unincorporated entities, however, motivations play a
lesser role because the actors may not be under a duty to act in the best
interests of others. Rather, the duties of partners and managers are contrac-
tual in nature. Recognizing this, the courts have had to fashion a concept of
good faith, which statutorily cannot be contracted away, that addresses
objectionable, usually opportunistic, behavior. Pursuing this endeavor, the
courts are developing a coherent jurisprudence grounded on long-standing
equitable principles but true to principles of contract law.
Are the two concepts of good faith consistent with one another?
While on their face they are divergent, in fact there are important
commonalities. A manager of an LLC who has contractual freedom to agree
to a certain proposal (as in VGS, Inc.) may nonetheless be found to act in bad
faith if the manager disappoints the reasonable expectations of a member. It
is conceivable, however, that a court may recharacterize this behavior as
violating good faith because it is an action in reckless disregard of the
interests of the complaining member. While the law has apparently
developed parallel, but distinct, standards for the concept of good faith-
"conscious disregard" derived from fiduciary law in the corporate world and
"reasonable expectations" derived from contract principles in the
unincorporated world-this divergence may be more apparent than real. I
have tried to show that these concepts are malleable and derived from an
overarching principle of equity articulated in Schnell. The amendment to the
Delaware corporate code permitting modification of the duty of loyalty
suggests that corporations will become more contractual in nature, at least in
regard to fiduciary duties, encouraging courts, in difficult cases, to draw on
the notion of good faith developed in the parallel universe of unincorporated
entity law. At the same time, the evolving principle of good faith being
developed in corporate law may prove alluring to judges deciding difficult
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cases in unincorporated entity law, where the contract seems to clearly
permit the conduct in question.

